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Since 1965, Britain’s major political parties have radically, and repeatedly, changed the ways in 
which they choose their leaders. Building on a recent comparative study of party leadership 
selection in the five principal Anglophone (‘Westminster’) parliamentary democracies (Cross and 
Blais, 2012a), this article first outlines a theoretical framework that purports to explain why the 
major parties in three of those countries, including Britain, have adopted such reform. It then 
examines why five major British parties have done so since 1965. It argues that, while Cross and 
Blais’ study makes a significant contribution to our knowledge and understanding of processes of 
party leadership selection reform in Anglophone parliamentary democracies, it has limited 
explanatory power when applied to changes enacted by the major parties in modern and 
contemporary Britain. Instead, the adoption of such reform in the British context is ultimately best 
understood and explained by examining both the internal politics and external circumstances of 
individual parties. 
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Choosing Party Leaders: Anglophone Democracies, British Parties and the Limits of Comparative 
Politics 
Introduction 
Since 1965, Britain’s major political parties have radically, and repeatedly, changed the ways in 
which they choose their leaders (Punnett, 1992; Stark, 1996; Denham and O’Hara, 2008; Heppell, 
2008; Heppell, 2010; Quinn, 2012; Bale and Webb, 2014). Consistent with developments in other 
parliamentary democracies (LeDuc, 2001; Kenig, 2009a: Kenig, 2009b; Cross and Blais, 2012a; Cross 
and Blais, 2012b; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and Pilet, 2015) they have expanded their leadership 
selectorates beyond parliamentary elites to include party members (Quinn, 2010), delegates and 
members of affiliated organizations, particularly trade unions (Drucker, 1981; Quinn, 2004; 
Wickham-Jones, 2014) and even latterly, in the case of the Labour Party, their affiliated and 
registered supporters (Quinn, 2015; Dorey and Denham, 2016). Building on a recent comparative 
study of party leadership selection in the five principal Anglophone (‘Westminster’) parliamentary 
democracies (Cross and Blais, 2012a), this article first sets out its theoretical framework that 
purports to explain why the major parties in three of those countries, including Britain, have 
adopted such reform. It then examines why five major British parties—the Liberal Party, the Labour 
Party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party—have 
done so since 1965. It argues that, while Cross and Blais’ study makes a significant contribution to 
our knowledge and understanding of processes of party leadership selection reform in Anglophone 
democracies, it has limited explanatory power when applied to changes enacted by the major 
parties in modern and contemporary Britain. Instead, the adoption of such reform in the British 
context is ultimately best understood and explained by examining both the internal politics and 
external circumstances of individual parties. 
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Anglophone Democracies: A Comparative Approach 
In a major work on party leadership selection in Britain between 1963 and 1995, Stark (1996, p. 2) 
argues that modern communications technology has focused unprecedented attention on party 
leaders. 
‘Leaders are symbols of their parties, so much so that inter-party competition is frequently 
portrayed as a battle between leaders. The Question Time confrontations between the 
Prime Minister and … Leader of the Opposition further foster this leader-centric view of 
politics. Party leadership is also the pathway to the premiership. Since World War Two, 
every Prime Minister has been a party leader. To a great extent, party leadership contests 
are gatekeepers to Number 10 Downing Street, drastically narrowing the pool of possible 
Prime Ministers’. 
From a comparative perspective, Cross and Blais (2012a, pp. 145-146) argue that leadership 
selection is one of the most important activities engaged in by political parties. Party leaders, they 
explain, are crucial figures in both the electoral and organizational activities of parties and in the 
legislative and executive arenas. 
‘The influence leaders have within their parties, and more broadly on public decision-
making, makes the question of who selects them crucial to any enquiry about who wields 
democratic influence. Given the changing norms of intra-party democracy and the growing 
influence of party leaders, it is not surprising that we find significant change in selection 
methods in recent years. While not universal, the trend is away from selection by a small 
group of party elites towards empowerment of a party’s rank and file members’. 
This trend, they find, is almost universal among the major parties in three of the five principal 
Anglophone (‘Westminster’) parliamentary democracies (Britain, Canada and Ireland), but less 
evident in the other two (Australia and New Zealand), where factors such as the perceived 
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organizational chaos of the New Zealand ACT and Australian Democrats after including their 
memberships in leadership selection, the absence of regional imbalance of parliamentary 
representation found in Britain, Canada and Ireland and their shorter electoral cycles have 
contributed to the reluctance of the major parties to adopt such reform. 
Party organizational reform, Cross and Blais argue, is best explained by considering changes in a 
party’s external environment and/or internal circumstances. In terms of the former, change in a 
party’s competitive position relative to others is a key factor; ‘as a basic rule, winners seldom 
innovate’, whereas a negative change in a party’s competitive position often stimulates reform. 
Hence, a first hypothesis to explain why parties choose to expand their leadership selectorates is 
that they will only do so after an electoral setback. In other words, party organizational change of 
this sort tends to be ‘proximally preceded by poor electoral performance’ (Harmel et al, 1995, p. 3). 
A second is that parties are more likely to do so when in opposition than in government. Opposition 
parties, they explain, are ‘more amenable to change’, because of two factors: ‘a reluctance to 
expand the selectorate when choosing a Prime Minister and a shift in the balance of power away 
from the parliamentary to the extra parliamentary party with removal from government’ (Cross and 
Blais, 2012a, pp. 129-130). 
Cross and Blais’ third hypothesis is that new parties will more readily adopt leadership selection 
rules that allow a greater role for rank-and-file members than their older, more established 
counterparts. 
‘These parties typically have smaller parliamentary caucuses, and so the extra parliamentary 
party has more influence and faces less opposition from an entrenched parliamentary group 
protecting what it sees as its natural turf. New parties are trying to differentiate themselves 
from their established competitors and adopting organizational innovation is one way to do 
so’. 
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A further relevant contextual factor, they argue, is contagion. Parties live in a competitive 
environment and internal party democracy is generally welcomed by voters and activists as a sign 
that a party is inclusive and responsive, committed to openness and participation, and hence 
‘democratic’. In addition, when one party innovates in the direction of enhanced internal party 
democracy, there is increased pressure on others to do the same. The perceived success of 
reformers in one party encourages their counterparts in others and provides the latter with 
additional ammunition in advocating such reform. Hence, a fourth hypothesis is that parties are 
more likely to expand their leadership selectorates when at least one of their competitors (or 
historical antecedents) has done so already.  
Testing each hypothesis in turn, Cross and Blais identify 16 major parties in Britain, Canada and 
Ireland that increased the influence of party members in leadership selection between 1965 and 
2009. They find strong support for the hypothesis that parties are more likely to adopt such reform 
when in opposition than in government. A second hypothesis, that change is particularly likely to 
take place after an electoral setback, is similarly confirmed.  
'Our evidence suggests that an electoral setback highlights the need within a party for 
organizational rebuilding. Particularly after a defeat resulting in the loss of government, the 
leadership often acquiesces to arguments that the membership party was allowed to wither 
and needs to be revitalized in order to again succeed electorally…. Party officials suggest 
that expanding the leadership selectorate is a way of being responsive to activists and 
providing them with a greater role in party decision-making. These factors were particularly 
important for the Canadian and [British] Conservatives and Ireland’s Fine Gael’. (Cross and 
Blais, 2012a, p. 134) 
A third hypothesis, that new parties are more likely to adopt such reform, is also confirmed. Of the 
seven new parties, four granted full authority to their members from the outset, while two others 
did so shortly after their creation.  
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The evidence, Cross and Blais discover, is also consistent with the fourth hypothesis, that there is, 
indeed, a contagion effect. 
‘For example, young members of Fine Gael advocating … change pointed to the expanded 
leadership selectorate in other Irish parties and parties abroad…. Similarly, activists in the 
[British] Conservative Party used [New] Labour’s earlier extension of the franchise to bolster 
their case, and activists in the Canadian parties drew support from earlier adoption of 
member votes at both the provincial and federal levels... once one competitive party in a 
system expands its leadership selectorate it becomes more difficult for the other parties to 
resist change’. (Cross and Blais, 2012a, pp. 135-136) 
While generally supported by the evidence, however, the four hypotheses appear to be merely 
necessary, not sufficient, conditions. Based on the British, Canadian and Irish experience, Cross and 
Blais argue, parties only adopt such reform when in opposition and after an electoral setback. Many 
of these parties, however, had experienced earlier electoral setbacks when they did not do so 
(though they may well have adopted other forms of organizational change).  
‘What appears to be essential is to understand which organizational changes are at play and 
thus on a potential reform agenda. Particularly relevant here is the contagion factor. The 
adoption of a wider leadership selectorate by one party within a system is evidence that this 
is on the menu of potential reforms’. (Cross and Blais, 2012a, p. 136) 
In short, Cross and Blais argue, while it is not always possible to explain the first instance of 
innovation within a system, we can generally predict the subsequent behaviour of the remaining 
parties. 
‘After the first party adopts change, others initially resist, notwithstanding occasional 
pressure to reform, until they are in opposition and suffer an electoral setback. The first time 
they meet all three conditions — the availability of a contagion, being in opposition [and] 
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suffering an electoral defeat — they adopt reform. New parties adopt the reform early on, 
with the exception of those created around a powerful parliamentary figure’.  
The same pattern, Cross and Blais argue, can be seen in all three countries (Britain, Canada and 
Ireland). In this sense, they argue, ‘our conditions appear to be both necessary and sufficient’. 
Having set out this general framework, the next four sections seek to explain how and why five 
major British parties (the Liberal Party, the Labour Party, the SDP, the Liberal Democrats and the 
Conservative Party) adopted such reform. 
 
A Study in Miniature: The Liberal Party 
The first ‘major’ British party to expand its selectorate beyond its parliamentary caucus was the 
Liberal Party in 1976. As Punnett (1992, p. 132) explains, from the Party’s birth in 1868 until its 
merger with the SDP in 1988, Liberal leaders were chosen by a variety of means. 
‘Indeed, the Liberals constitute a study in miniature of the range of possible selection 
methods. Their experience extends from the most closed of processes (selection of the 
leader, in effect, by the Monarch) to the most open (election by a ballot of party members). 
Between these extremes, Liberal leaders were produced by a ballot of MPs, or by the mutual 
agreement of Ministers, MPs or the potential leaders themselves’. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Liberal and Conservative parties shared two 
assumptions about the Party’s leadership. First, when the Party was in office, the choice of Party 
Leader was subject to the Monarch’s prerogative of appointing the Prime Minister. Second, when in 
opposition, the Party would require a leader in both the Commons and the Lords, but not 
(necessarily) an overall ‘Party Leader’. The latter position was filled only when a former Prime 
Minister was available, and willing, to serve in that capacity. If not, it would remain vacant and be 
subject to the Monarch’s prerogative when the party next won a General Election. The Monarch’s 
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choice of Prime Minister would then be endorsed by the Party’s MPs and peers. Neither party had a 
written constitution, formally prescribing one selection system or another. The Liberals, for their 
part, had ‘a philosophical commitment to the principle of producing a leader through mutual 
agreement rather than by a staged battle’ (Punnett, 1992, pp. 132-133).  
In 1967, the Liberal Party’s leadership was formally contested for the first time, by three of its 12 
MPs. A secret ballot was held the day after the announcement of Jo Grimond’s resignation as Party 
Leader. Jeremy Thorpe received six votes, his two opponents three apiece. Despite Thorpe’s failure 
to win an overall majority—even after second preferences had been counted—his opponents agreed 
to withdraw and Thorpe was duly elected by unanimous ‘consent’. The whole procedure was 
‘haphazard’ and the manner of Thorpe’s election subject to much criticism within the Party and 
‘bitter protests’ from its rank and file. Some objected to the unseemly haste with which MPs had 
resolved the succession. Moreover, although the Party had thousands of members and, in a typical 
General Election, millions of voters, the electorate had comprised a mere dozen individuals, 
including the candidates themselves. The fact that a quarter of Liberal MPs had stood for the 
leadership was a further source of ridicule within the Party, and beyond (Stark, 1996, pp. 70-71). 
Claims by MPs to be representative of the Party as a whole were negated by the fact that most 
served rural constituencies in the Celtic fringe, whereas the bulk of Liberal activists lived in urban 
areas (Punnett, 1992, p. 136).  
By 1976, two of Cross and Blais’ necessary conditions were in place. The Liberal Party was in 
opposition and had suffered a (minor) loss of parliamentary seats in the preceding General Election 
of October 1974 (Cross and Blais, 2012a, p. 135). These two factors alone, however, provide an 
insufficient explanation of its decision to adopt reform. By this time, the Liberals had been the third 
largest party in terms of parliamentary seats for more than half a century. In the 1970 General 
Election, it had returned only six MPs. This increased to 14 in February 1974, when it received over 
six million votes. In October 1974, the Liberal Party’s vote declined by 1 million, and the size of the 
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parliamentary Party was reduced by one, to 13 MPs. In short, the Liberal Party’s opposition status 
was, by now, long-established and the electoral ‘setback’ it had suffered in the previous General 
Election more evident in terms of votes than parliamentary seats.  
In addition to the Party’s opposition status, the ‘setback’ it had suffered in the previous General 
Election and the specific internal factors highlighted above — the ‘haphazard’ procedure used and 
manner of Thorpe’s election in 1967, the modest size of the parliamentary Party and a regional 
imbalance in its parliamentary representation — a sufficient explanation for its adoption of reform 
must also include the increasing pressure during the 1970s for a more open method of selecting the 
Party Leader from a growing number of new members in local constituency parties who were 
‘determined to apply within the Party the sort of participatory democracy they were preaching in 
government and industry’ (Steed, 1977, p. 32) and the growing strength of the extra parliamentary 
Party within the Liberal organization (Kavanagh, 1983).  
In May 1976, Thorpe resigned as leader, not for electoral reasons (although the Liberal vote had 
fallen significantly in the English local elections and single parliamentary by-election held in 1975) 
but because of allegations of serious misconduct in his personal and business affairs (Steed, 1977, 
pp. 32-33). In June, a special Assembly was held in Manchester to decide on a new system for 
choosing his successor. As Stark (1996, p. 73) explains, 
‘The new rules were passed, on a show of hands, just nine months after the Party had 
endorsed its traditional system of election by MPs. It would likely have reaffirmed this 
position in 1976 had it not been for the crisis created by the unfortunate circumstances 
surrounding Thorpe’s downfall. Instead, the Liberals became the first British party to adopt 
an all-party ballot to elect its leader’. 
Although the franchise was extended to Party members, MPs retained control of nominations. 
Prospective candidates had to be MPs, proposed by five members or one-fifth of the parliamentary 
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Party, whichever was the lower figure. Each constituency party was allocated a quota of votes 
according to a complex formula that took into account the size of its membership, year of affiliation 
to the national Party and the number of votes polled by the Liberal candidate in the previous 
General Election. 
In the words of its designer, Michael Steed, this system, ‘balancing … election by the Party 
membership with a special role for MPs’, was a ‘cunning mix of parliamentary and mass-Party 
influences, of traditional Liberal and Radical ideas about democracy’ (Steed, 1977, p. 32). In the 
event, it was to be used, like its ‘haphazard’ predecessor in 1967, by the Party only once, and 
replaced by the principle – never, as it turned out, the practice – of a strict system of ‘One Member, 
One Vote’ in 1981. 
 
From Factions to Fractions: The Labour Party 
The same year, the Labour Party replaced its long-standing system of election by MPs with an 
Electoral College. As Stark (1996, pp. 36-37) explains, the Labour Party’s origins were very different 
from those of its Conservative and Liberal counterparts. 
‘Conservative [and Liberal] Members of Parliament created their mass party organization in 
the nineteenth century for the purpose of strengthening the MPs’ support. By contrast, the 
Parliamentary Labour Party was founded at the turn of the [twentieth] century by the labour 
movement to represent its interests in parliament. The PLP was intended to play an 
important, though decidedly subservient, role within the labour movement’. 
The post of ‘Chairman of the PLP’ was held by a succession of MPs from 1906 until 1922, when it 
evolved into that of ‘Leader of the PLP’ because of the change in Labour’s parliamentary status. 
Following the 1922 General Election, Labour became the second largest party in the House of 
Commons and was, accordingly, required to fill the office of Leader of the Opposition. Ramsay 
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MacDonald was duly elected ‘Chairman and Leader of the PLP’, having formally challenged and 
narrowly defeated the incumbent Chairman, John Clynes. Unofficially, MacDonald, and his 
successors until 1978, when the post of Party Leader was officially endorsed as Party policy, was 
recognised as leader not only of the PLP, but of the Party as a whole (Stark, 1996, pp. 37-39, 44; 
Punnett, 1992, p. 81). 
Until 1981, the Labour leader was elected exclusively by MPs, in one or more secret ballots. 
Prospective candidates were required to declare themselves at the outset, and a series of 
eliminative ballots be held until one of them secured an overall majority. The rationale for this 
system was twofold. First, it was seen as straightforward and efficient, in that it would produce a 
decisive result, within a relatively short period of time. Second, it was seen as imperative that the 
party leader should enjoy the confidence of a majority of the PLP. Labour MPs, it was argued, and 
they alone, should choose the party leader, being (literally) best placed to assess their colleagues’ 
actual or potential leadership credentials. 
As Stark (1996, p. 41) explains, the campaign to extend the franchise began as early as 1969. 
Although the previous two Labour Party Conferences of 1978 and 1979 had voted to retain the 
system of election by MPs alone, a National Executive Committee (NEC) resolution in 1980 gave 
delegates a further opportunity to change their minds. This was carried, by the narrowest of 
margins, and an ‘emergency resolution’ approved to hold a special conference at Wembley in 
January 1981, to consider how to implement the wider franchise. At Wembley, the option of 
creating an Electoral College was overwhelmingly approved on the first ballot. After three further 
ballots to determine its exact composition, delegates chose to allocate 30 per cent to MPs, 30 per 
cent to Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) and the remaining 40 per cent to trade unions and other 
affiliated organizations (Drucker, 1981). 
By 1981, two of Cross and Blais’ necessary conditions were in place. Labour was in opposition, 
having lost the previous General Election in 1979. In addition to these factors, a sufficient 
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explanation for its adoption of reform must also include the efforts of a broader participatory 
movement in the Party and the ‘extraordinary’ determination and mobilization skills of the 
reformers, both before and after the General Election (Russell, 2005; Stark, 1996). As with the 
Liberal Party in 1976, there is no evidence of a contagion effect, even though the Liberals had 
recently moved in a similar direction. In Labour’s case, the creation of an Electoral College was 
already on the ‘menu’ of potential reforms, following the recommendations of a working party in 
1977 (Stark, 1996, p. 44). Labour’s decision to adopt a 30—30—40 per cent division of votes 
between MPs, CLPs and affiliated organizations was also protracted and made in bizarre 
circumstances. As Garnett (2006, p. 148) explains, this option would have been defeated, but the 
engineers’ union, which had been mandated to cast its block vote only in support of motions which 
gave the majority of Electoral College votes to MPs, ‘took its instructions too literally and abstained, 
thus ensuring the success of a system it opposed’. 
In 1992, Labour lost a fourth successive General Election, prompting renewed consideration of the 
Party’s relationship with the trade unions. By now, almost the entire PLP leadership wanted to 
reform the Electoral College, on the grounds that the influence of the unions and their leaders was 
excessive and illegitimate. Following a review, the NEC recommended that the PLP section, which 
had been extended to include Labour Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in 1991, CLPs 
and affiliated bodies should henceforth receive an equal (one-third) share of the votes. Union block 
voting was abolished, and replaced by a system of postal ballots, to be conducted on the basis of 
One Levy-Payer, One Vote (OLOV). CLP block voting was similarly abolished; instead, all Party 
members would henceforth be entitled to participate in a postal ballot: One Member, One Vote 
(Quinn, 2004; Wickham-Jones, 2014). 
Designed to counter the impression that Labour was ‘dominated’ by the unions, the adoption of 
these changes sought to return primary importance in Labour leadership contests to the PLP, in 
terms of both its ‘gate-keeping’ powers over nominations (the initial threshold of five per cent of 
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MPs for challenges and vacancies alike had been increased to 20 and 12.5 per cent respectively by 
1993) and its ability to shape such contests a whole. Despite this, a candidate who trailed another in 
terms of backing from the PLP could still emerge as the eventual winner, once individual Party 
members’ and/or union levy-payers’ votes were aggregated and counted (Quinn, 2004). This duly 
happened when, having received a far greater number of votes from union members and more 
second preference votes from the PLP and Party members, Ed Miliband narrowly defeated his older 
brother—and erstwhile favourite and front-runner—David, in 2010 (Dorey and Denham, 2011; 
Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013).  
In 2014, following controversy over the selection of Labour’s prospective parliamentary candidate 
for a by-election in Falkirk, the Electoral College was abolished and replaced by a new system, 
consisting of three categories of voter: Party members, including MPs and MEPs; levy-paying 
members of trade unions and other organizations affiliated to the Party, who were obliged to 
register as ‘affiliated supporters’; and ‘registered supporters’, who were neither of the above. The 
latter were entitled to vote in future leadership elections provided they signed a declaration that 
they supported the ‘aim and values’ of the Labour Party and not rival organizations and agreed to 
pay a modest fee of three pounds. The new system proved to be highly controversial on its first 
outing in 2015, with allegations that members and supporters of rival organizations had registered 
to vote (Quinn, 2015; Dorey and Denham, 2016). As with the creation and subsequent 
reconfiguration of the Electoral College, Labour’s new system was adopted when the Party was in 
opposition, having lost the General Election of 2010, but these were merely necessary, not 
sufficient, conditions. Given that other major British parties, including the Conservatives, had 
previously extended the franchise to their memberships, it is conceivable that there was a 
‘contagion effect’, although there is no concrete evidence that this was a ‘particularly relevant’ 
factor in Labour’s decision. 
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‘New’ Parties: The SDP and the Liberal Democrats 
Had the Labour Party not adopted an Electoral College to elect its leader, the SDP might never have 
existed. All but one of the 14 MPS who launched the Party in March 1981 had recently defected 
from Labour. As one of their number, David Owen, later explained, ‘What we could never believe 
was that a leader of the party elected on the basis of an Electoral College, which would put the 
leader in the pocket of the trade unions, would ever have the power to win back the vital policy 
ground that had been lost’ (Stark, 1996, pp. 74-75). Despite the key role that leadership selection 
had played in their decision to leave Labour, however, the SDP’s MPs disagreed among themselves 
as to how the leader of their new party should be chosen. 
In contrast to Labour, the SDP resembled the nineteenth-century Conservative and Liberal parties in 
that its organization in Parliament pre-dated its structure beyond the House of Commons. As 
Punnett (1992, pp. 138-139) explains, 
‘The Party was built ‘from the top down’ by prestigious MPs who had left the Labour Party 
after many years in Parliament and, in some cases, in government. What is more, they had 
left the Labour Party, to a great extent, because they felt that the parliamentary [Labour] 
party was being subjected to unacceptable levels of control by the activists in the 
constituencies. Thus they were determined to avoid the same situation developing in the 
new party’. 
As Drucker (1986, p. 119) notes, the MPs who founded the SDP created a structure in which its 
leaders — all of whom would be MPs — had ‘considerable incentive to be attentive to the interests 
and wishes of ordinary party members, but in which both initiative and final decision rested 
ultimately with the leaders’. The Party’s extensive extra-parliamentary structure, created quite 
rapidly at local, regional and national levels, was, however, disproportionate to the size of the 
parliamentary party. The expectation of SDP MPs was that their numbers in Parliament would 
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rapidly increase. Initially, however, a significant feature of the new party was ‘the imbalance 
between the authoritative but small parliamentary party and the extensive extra-parliamentary 
organization based on a growing number of individual members’ (Punnett, 1992, p. 139). 
The competing claims of the SDP’s parliamentary and extra-parliamentary elements revealed 
themselves clearly in its internal debates over which method the Party should use to select the 
leader. While there was unambiguous rejection of the activist democracy that had led to the 
creation of Labour’s Electoral College, there was disagreement over the competing claims of 
‘parliamentary democracy’ (election of the leader by MPs) and ‘popular democracy’ (election via a 
ballot of party members). In an attempt to reconcile these two points of view, two compromise 
proposals were considered. The first was that SDP MPs would elect a leader who would then be 
assessed by the Party’s governing body, the Council for Social Democracy. If the MPs’ choice of 
leader was not acceptable, Party members would be invited to choose between the original 
candidates via a postal ballot, conducted on the basis of One Member, One Vote. The second was 
that the SDP’s first leader should be selected by a ballot of Party members, but that the choice 
should then revert to MPs after 1984, by which time it was anticipated the new party would have 
more MPs. 
Three options were presented to a constitutional convention in February 1982. Delegates were 
asked to decide whether (a) MPs alone should always elect the leader, (b) OMOV should always be 
used, or (c) the Party’s first leader should be chosen by OMOV and all subsequent leaders by MPs. 
OMOV was supported by 166 delegates, 73 voted for the compromise proposal, while only 63 
preferred election by MPs from the outset. This did not yet resolve the issue. Party members still 
had to endorse the constitution. Besides voting on the constitution as a whole, the ballot also 
reiterated the three options for leadership selection listed above. Ballot papers were sent out in 
April and the results announced in May. OMOV received 16,196 votes, 12,560 backed the 
compromise proposal and 8,500 voted for election by MPs. Most of the latter preferred the 
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compromise proposal to OMOV, so that when second preferences were redistributed OMOV 
defeated the compromise proposal by 16,618 votes to 15,670. Barely half of the supporters of 
election by MPs had listed a second choice. Had more of them done so, the SDP might not have 
adopted OMOV (Stark, 1996, p. 77). While Party members would form the electorate, control over 
nominations remained firmly with MPs. Candidates had to be MPs, nominated by at least 15 per 
cent of their parliamentary colleagues.  
In the case of the SDP, Cross and Blais’ hypothesis that ‘new’ parties will more easily adopt 
leadership selection rules that allow a greater role for their members than their more established 
counterparts and that adopting a selectorate beyond the parliamentary caucus is ‘more easily 
managed’ by new parties is highly problematic. In fact, the SDP found the adoption of a wider 
selectorate anything but ‘easy’ to adopt and manage. As noted above, OMOV was eventually 
adopted by Party members, but only by the narrowest of margins, and the Party’s MPs retained 
exclusive control over the nomination of candidates. 
As Punnett (1992, pp. 140-141) notes, the SDP’s new system was specified in considerable detail, 
and emerged from many levels of consultation. Hence, it is ‘somewhat ironic’ that it was to be so 
little used. A new SDP leader was chosen on only three occasions between its adoption in 1982 and 
the Party’s eventual merger with the Liberals in 1988, and on two of these there was only one 
candidate. In March 1988, the memberships of both parties were balloted. Both endorsed the final 
merger agreement, which included OMOV for leadership elections. As Stark (1996, p. 80) notes, 
‘Despite the difficulty both parent parties had previously encountered in formulating their 
leadership selection rules, this was one matter which never became contentious during the 
negotiations which created the Liberal Democrats’. Prospective candidates had to be MPs, and 
nominated by MPs and at least 200 members from 20 local parties. This involvement of party 
members in the nomination process distinguishes the Liberal Democrats from the Labour and 
17 
 
Conservative parties, both of whom leave the nomination of candidates exclusively in the hands of 
the Party’s MPs, as did the SDP and the Liberals in 1976. 
 
From Grey Suits to Grassroots: The Conservative Party 
In 1967, the Liberal Party became the last of the (then) major British parties to elect its leader via a 
secret ballot of MPs. In 1976, the Liberals became the first to do so via a ballot of its membership. 
The Conservative Party formally elected its leader for the first time, via a secret ballot of MPs, in 
1965. In 1998, the Conservatives became the last of the major British parties to expand the 
leadership selectorate beyond its parliamentary caucus, to include Party members. 
Prior to 1965, the Conservative Party leader was not formally elected, but ‘emerged’ through 
processes of informal consultation. 
‘Senior Party figures within the Party assessed opinion on the relative merits of potential 
leaders and a name was evolved through these deliberations. The person who was chosen in 
this way was duly adopted as leader at a gathering of the Party’s parliamentarians and 
others, but this was … merely the coronation of someone selected by a process that was 
essentially informal and mysterious’. (Punnett, 1992, p. 27) 
This system, known as the ‘magic circle’, was used until the controversial succession to Harold 
Macmillan in 1963. Macmillan’s sudden resignation in October that year turned the Party’s annual 
Conference into an unofficial leadership convention, a situation for which there was no historical 
precedent. The subsequent ‘emergence’ of Lord Home as Prime Minister and Party Leader, while 
acceptable to most senior Party figures, was wholly unacceptable to others, and hence divided 
opinion. To make matters worse, the Conservatives went on to lose the 1964 General Election. The 
all-too-visible contrast between the ‘fourteenth Earl’ and his recently elected Labour opposite 
number, Harold Wilson, made the ‘magic circle’ appear anachronistic, and hence an electoral liability 
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in a self-consciously ‘modern’ era. The solution to this problem was the introduction in 1965 of a 
formal procedure for electing the Conservative leader. Between 1965 and 1997, six elections were 
held, with an electorate restricted to the Party’s MPs. 
The unruly behaviour of the parliamentary Party from 1992 to 1997 had angered many 
Conservatives in the country, some of whom had long been unhappy with their virtual exclusion 
from the process of choosing the Party Leader. Consequently, one of William Hague’s promises 
during his campaign for the leadership in 1997 had been to change the system if he won. The 
following year, the system introduced in 1965 which restricted the franchise to Conservative MPs 
alone finally came to an end. 
The changes to the existing rules were essentially twofold. First, the rule allowing an annual 
challenge to the incumbent — long regarded as unsatisfactory — was scrapped and there would 
now be an additional hurdle for a would-be challenger to surmount. In order to trigger a contest in 
future, 15 per cent of the Party’s MPs would have to write to the Chairman of the 1922 Committee 
demanding a vote of confidence, which could be held at any time. Should the incumbent win this 
initial vote (a simple majority of MPs would suffice), he would be immune to any further challenge 
for 12 months; if not, he would have to resign and be barred from standing in any subsequent 
contest. Instead, there would be a series of eliminative ballots among MPs. Once MPs had reduced 
the field to two candidates, the second change could come into effect: Party members would have 
the final say by means of a postal ballot. 
As Cross and Blais (2012a, p. 138) note, the Conservatives adopted this reform shortly after 
returning to the opposition benches in 1997. Following the Party’s landslide defeat, there were 
‘widespread demands for an immediate change to give the extra-parliamentary Party a share of the 
votes in deciding the succession’, but these were ignored by MPs, who not only elected the next 
leader themselves, but in choosing William Hague also ignored the clear preference of constituency 
19 
 
chairmen representing local parties for the vastly more experienced and popular Kenneth Clarke 
(Alderman, 1999, p. 265). As Cross and Blais explain, 
‘The need to rebuild the extra parliamentary Party after a long run in government and the 
1997 electoral defeat, a demand for greater party democracy among activists and the view 
that leadership selection should not be decided by a minority parliamentary Party with no 
representation from Scotland and Wales came together to make the demands for change 
unstoppable’. 
In addition to these factors, a sufficient explanation for the Conservatives’ adoption of reform must 
also include the fact that giving Party members a say in electing the leader was ‘used as a quid pro 
quo by a leader (William Hague) for wide-ranging (and centralizing) organizational reforms that 
might otherwise have been rejected at grassroots level’ (Bale and Webb, 2014, p. 18). As Kelly (2003, 
pp. 86-87, 102) explains, 
`According to one of Hague’s supporters … what the new leader really wanted all along was 
the “New Labourfication” of the Conservative organization, based on Hague’s covert 
admiration for Labour’s approach to opposition after 1994…. as with New Labour, the 
leadership’s use of OMOV was less a sign of thoroughbred democracy than of short-term 
party management, helping to stifle the leader’s critics within the parliamentary party while 
making the Party look more “modern” and “inclusive”’. 
Although there is clear evidence here of a ‘contagion effect’, Cross and Blais’ account makes no 
mention of the fact that, Party members having elected Iain Duncan Smith as Hague’s successor in 
2001, Conservative MPs had lost patience with him by 2003 and, fearing another long, divisive and 
expensive contest in the country, then contrived, having deposed Duncan Smith in a vote of 
confidence, to nominate a single candidate, Michael Howard, as their next leader. Having resigned 
after a third consecutive General Election defeat in 2005, Howard then attempted – in the end, 
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unsuccessfully – to narrow the selectorate for choosing his successor and ensure that MPs alone 
would have the final say in selecting future Party leaders (Denham and Dorey, 2006, pp. 35-36; 
Denham and O’Hara, 2008; Heppell, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
As this article has shown, British political parties, like their counterparts in other Westminster 
parliamentary systems, have radically changed the ways in which they choose their leaders since 
1965. Expanding on Cross and Blais’ study of party leadership selection in the five principal 
Anglophone democracies – Australia, Britain, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand – it first identified 
four hypotheses that purport to explain why the major parties in three of those countries, including 
Britain, have adopted such reform: first, that parties will only expand their leadership selectorates 
beyond the parliamentary caucus after an electoral setback; second, that they are more likely to 
adopt such reform when in opposition than in government; third, that new parties adopt and 
manage such reform more easily than their older and more established counterparts; and fourth, 
that parties are more likely to adopt such reform when at least one of their competitors (or historical 
antecedents) has done so already.  
Having outlined this general framework, the article then examined why five major British parties 
have expanded their leadership selectorates beyond parliamentary elites since 1965. Broadly 
speaking, the British experience confirms each of Cross and Blais’ necessary conditions outlined 
above. On every occasion, the party in question chose to expand the selectorate for choosing its 
leader when in opposition. In most cases, they adopted such reform following a setback in the 
previous General Election. The two ‘new’ parties, the SDP and the Liberal Democrats, adopted 
OMOV more swiftly and easily than their more established counterparts and (almost) from the 
outset, and the Liberal Democrats did so more swiftly and easily than the SDP. A further relevant 
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factor was, arguably, contagion. Like their counterparts in other Anglophone parliamentary 
democracies, the major British parties, with the exception of the Liberals in 1976, expanded the 
selectorate for choosing their leaders when at least one of their competitors – or, in the case of the 
Liberal Democrats, parental antecedents – had done so already. 
As this article has shown, however, these general factors were merely necessary, not sufficient, 
conditions to explain why the major British parties have adopted such reform. It is no surprise to 
discover that the two main parties, Labour and Conservative, did so when in opposition, not in 
government, and after an electoral setback. They were highly unlikely to have done so after an 
electoral triumph which saw either party cruising to victory in a General Election. The case of the 
SDP also shows that ‘new’ parties do not necessarily find the adoption of such reform easier to 
manage than their older, more established counterparts. Finally, with the exception of the 
Conservative Party in 1998, Cross and Blais provide no evidence to suggest that contagion was a 
‘particularly important’ factor in the British context.  
In its defence, Cross and Blais’ landmark study is merely one example of the inherent limits of 
comparative politics, something the authors themselves acknowledge in the following disclaimer 
(2012b, p. 43):  
‘[W]e examine cases of change and non-change in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Canada, 
beginning with the first party to adopt reform in each country. Space permits only a brief 
overview of the context surrounding reform.… We cannot provide a full, detailed account of 
change in each party…. Readers are encouraged to consult the cited party and country-
specific literature for a full account of the individual cases’.  
In sum, while Cross and Blais’ study makes a significant contribution to our knowledge and 
understanding of party leadership selection reform in Anglophone democracies, it has limited 
explanatory power when applied to the British experience. Instead, the adoption of such reform in 
22 
 
the British context is best understood and explained by examining the internal politics and external 
circumstances of individual parties. 
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